the New Pantagruel

The Morality of Complacency, from Icarus Fallen

by Chantal Delsol

he morality of our time could be defined as a morality of complacency.

Contrary to what one might at first think, there is no contradiction in terms here, since complacency does after all have its norms, and even its demands, to which society ultimately submits.

Only by Jim Janknegt

Complacency is an overall penchant, an art de vivre. It could even be considered an ethical system, in the sense that it can eventually become a practice that establishes norms for itself. What interests the contemporary individual is less the accomplishment of a “good,” which he does not know how to define in objective terms, as self-fulfillment in the short term, which has now become the ultimate criterion of the “good.” An act is considered to be good if it allows the individual to fulfill himself. The question of criteria remains unresolved, however, for how is one to define self-fulfillment? In fact, it can be measured only by the standard of satisfaction.

Complacency indicates a predisposition to seek pleasure. Raised to the level of a principle, it supposes the permanent identification of the good with that which pleases. To be complacent means to be easily accommodating, to admit whatever is convenient, or to look kindly on whatever comes one’s way. It indicates an open or easily obtained indulgence, without any judgment attached. It accepts things in advance.¹ It can become a sort of selfish servility. All this is true of present morals in general–in the relationships contemporary man has with his work, with money, with authority, and with others.

The ethics of complacency legitimizes and recognizes all thought, all behavior, and all ways of life–on the condition, of course, that they do not oppose complacency itself.

The complacent man is, in a manner of speaking, a slave to what pleases him, in the sense that he has trouble stepping back from what pleases him and examining it with a critical eye. He is therefore just as accepting of the unhappiness associated with what displeases him.

Icarus Fallen

He is complacent in sorrow and discouragement, and readily complains about what has befallen him, for he is unable to distance himself from his own ego, to lift himself above his displeasure.

The ethics of complacency legitimizes and recognizes all thought, all behavior, and all ways of life–on the condition, of course, that they do not oppose complacency itself. In doing so, this ethics constitutes a worldview, for it is not merely the attitude of the smiling sage, or of the fool who takes what comes without regard to its consequences.

The ethics of complacency’s indulgent accommodation of everything corresponds to a refusal to accept any established limits, or to a refusal to refuse, which brings to mind the the catchphrase of the 1968 generation, “It is forbidden to forbid.” The sweeping away of moral taboos during the preceding two decades was probably due less to a fading of the previously dominant religious thinking as to an inability of traditional thought to justify the barriers that, in the end, were being propped up only by the force of habit. Traditional thought had come to live more through its institutions than through its points of reference. We know that institutions, created to embody and perpetuate the certitude of these points of reference, often ended up abusively replacing what they were supposed to protect, and became mere hollow shells in the process. Thus, the ethics of complacency never had to impose itself by arguing for its legitimacy. On the contrary, it was able to impose itself without any argument at all, filling the vacuum left by other ethical systems whose points of reference had been lost along the way.

The ethics of complacency is an openness to all that is possible, which it justifies in advance. It closes no doors. Thus, the highest virtue of our time is open-mindedness. Our contemporary has said it all when he speaks of an open-minded person. We are not dealing here with the humanist who has pointed out errors and misdeeds but, without legitimizing them, is able to see the suffering humanity behind them. Rather, this is the man of accommodation, who has decided in advance that nothing can be called deviant or unnatural because he does not recognize any criteria according to which an idea or a behavior might be considered deviant. Unaware of any criteria of the good apart from that of well-being and pleasantness, he rejects any and all judgment: above all, “do not judge”–this is the obsession of our contemporary.

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